| dc.contributor.author | Kojima, Naoki | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-07-09T08:07:49Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-07-09T08:07:49Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017-02 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Theoretical Economics Letters, 2017, 7, 187-192 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2162-2086 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.4236/tel.2017.72016 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1736 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The present paper investigates the multi-dimensional mechanism design in
which buyers have taste and budget as their private information. The paper
shows an easy proof of a two-dimensional optimal direct mechanism by a
one-dimensional indirect mechanism: A canonical mechanism in the traditional
one-dimensional setting, i.e., function of one variable, the buyer’s taste.
It also sheds light on where the difficulty lies implementability of a general
direct mechanism—not optimal—by a canonical mechanism. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Scientific Research | en_US |
| dc.subject | Multi-Dimensional Mechanism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Indirect Mechanism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Budget Constraint | en_US |
| dc.subject | Revelation Principle | en_US |
| dc.title | Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
